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ABSTRACT 
We argue that the difficult and ill-understood task of estimating numerical degrees of 
belief for the propositions to be used in evidential reasoning can be avoided by replacing 
estimations of absolute values with the much simpler and more defensible assignments 
of relations. 
Using a well-known example we demonstrate that it is difficult to justify decisions 
based on numerical degrees of belief and to answer questions uch as "How do changes 
in the numbers affect the answers." This shows that the epistemological dequacy 
criterion for representations is violated and leads to the proposal of a representation 
method for uncertain information based on representing arguments such as "evidence  
supports alternative set A"  and relative strengths of arguments such as " e t supports A 1 
better than e 2 supports A2". We prove that, in a certain sense, belief unctions are 
equivalent o a special case of the proposed method, namely, the cases where all 
arguments are based on only one piece of evidence. Finally. we compare our approach 
to those of, for example, Cohen, Grosof, and Pearl. 
KEYWORDS: evidential reasoning, numerical degrees of belief, relative 
strengths, arguments 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The procedure of evidential reasoning that applies Dempster-Shafer's 
evidence theory [13] can be described briefly as follows [7, 14]: 
1. constructing frames of discernment and the compatibility relations; 
2. evaluating evidence terms to the appropriate frame of discernment; 
3. conducting evidential reasoning and determining the impact of evi- 
dence on the hypothesis; 
4. generating answers and explanations. 
Most evidential reasoning methods adopt a similar procedure and many 
are numerical methods (See [12] for description and comparison of many 
methods). By numerical methods, step 2, the evaluating step, will result in 
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assignments of numerical degrees of belief (usually, values in [0, 1]) to 
propositions. These numerical degrees of belief embody the estimates 
made by experts. 
The purpose of evidential reasoning is to elicit rational answers for some 
questions based on the estimates made by experts and to explain these 
answers. Usually, these questions require us to choose among some 
alternatives. The following problems arise: 
THE ESTIMATION PROBLEM "what kinds of estimates are required for 
answering the sorts of questions under consideration, and how will the 
changes of those estimates affect the answers?" 
Answering these questions will allow us to defend, or explain, the 
conclusion we obtain using evidential reasoning. 
In the following section, a well-known example of evidential reasoning is 
re-worked and it is shown that the numerical estimates are usually irrele- 
vant. By this we mean that changes of these estimates cause no changes in 
the answers. While there are cases where they are crucial, ie, changes to 
estimates will change the answers, it turns out that there is insufficient 
justification from the changes of evidence for the changes of answers in 
such cases. This motivates us to propose a new representation method for 
evidence. 
The proposed representation uses relations instead of numbers as carri- 
ers of evidential support strengths. In section 3, a representation method 
of evidential support based on representing arguments and their relation- 
ships with respect o their strengths i  proposed. We represent the example 
using the proposed method with enhanced epistemological dequacy (a 
term that we explicate later). Further justification of our method is made 
in section 4 by comparing it to some other methods, and we conclude the 
paper with a brief summary. 
2. RE-ANALYSIS OF A WELLKNOWN EXAMPLE 
The following example has been presented by Strat to illustrate the 
process of evidential reasoning and to illustrate how sensitivity analysis can 
be used in evidential reasoning as an explanation-generating mechanism 
[14]. 
EXAMPLE. The statements of evidence are as following: 
"At 9:00 I received aphone call from a San Mateo County police 
officer who informed me that someone in his district found my dog, 
Rufus, running loose. At 10:00, a coworker arrived and said he 
saw a dog that looked like Rufus cross Hwy 280 on his way to 
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work. Rufus has run away 10 times before--onby once did I find 
him in Palo Alto." 
The purpose of the evidential reasoning here is to answer the question "Where 
should I look for Rufus?" and to explain the answer. 
2.1 The Process Described in Strat's Paper Using Numbers 
After step 1 and step 2 (as defined in the introduction above), and some 
representation transformation which is part of step 3 (we'll see later that 
these steps are really the crucial ones), three pieces of evidence are 
evaluated and are represented as follows: 
.70, x = {MenloPark, Atherton, LosAitos, PaloAlto} ;
ml(x) = ~.30 x = (9. 
.75 x = {LosAltos, Sunnyvale, PaloAlto} ;
m2(x)  = .25 x=t9 .  
.10, x = {PaloAlto}; 
m3(x ) = .90, x = {Atherton, MenloPark,  Mountain View, 
LosAltos, Sunnyvale}. 
Here 19 = Oties@lO:O0 (different cities at time 10:00 am) is the discern- 
ment frame and the values in above representations happen to be just 
those original estimations .7, .75, .10, and .90, respectively. In the first two 
representations, the unassigned weights of evidence are assigned to 0 ,  the 
frame of discernment. 
These mass functions that represent evidence bodies are fused to form 
the resulting mass function: 
.47, x 
.20, x 
m(x) = .16, x 
.10, x 
.07, x 
From the mass function, spt 
[ spt, pls ]( x ) = 
Then the answer is reached: 
= {LosAltos} ; 
-- {l_~sAltos, Sunnyvale} ; 
= {Atherton, LosAltos, MenloPark} ; 
= {PaloAlto} ; 
= {Atherton, LosAltos, MenloPark, 
Mountain View, Sunnyvale}. 
and pls functions can be calculated as follows. 
[0,.23], x = {Atherton} ; 
[.47,.9], x = {LosAltos}; 
[0, .23], x = {MenloPark} ; 
[0, .07], x -- {MountainView} ; 
[.1, .1], x = {PaloAlto} ; 
[0, .27], x = {Sunnyvale}. 
"Try LosAltos." 
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This process is very impressive. After some calculation, all of a sudden, 
the conclusion turns up. It is very hard, however, to see clearly how the 
conclusion is reached, and it is this fact that gives Strat difficulty when 
developing a mechanism to explain the process. 
As a result, we are not satisfied with Strat's explanation mechanism, 
although it makes the process of evidential reasoning more tractable. The 
Estimation Problem above has not been answered. Keeping the process of 
evidential reasoning in mind, we can reformulate the problem more 
particularly, by referring to the specific numbers in the example, as follows: 
"Are these numbers needed? What are their effects? What do they tell 
us?" We can summarize these three questions in one--What is repre- 
sented by the numbers? 
Trying to answer this question, we substitute variables for the discrete 
values obtained from evidence evaluation. The mass functions for the 
original pieces of evidence, for the final evidence after fusion, and for the 
spt and pls values for the hypotheses {LosAltos} and {PaloAlto}, which are 
the hypotheses under consideration, are as follows: 
( i  x = {MenloPark, Atherton, LosAltos, PaloAlto}; 
ml(x) = t - l ' -a l '  x=t9 .  
= [a2, - x= {LosAltos, Sunnyvale, PaloAlto}; 
m2 
U a2,  x = O.  
a3, x = {PaloAlto} ; 
m 3 = 1 - -  a3, x = {Atherton, MenloPark, Mountain View, 
LosAltos, Sunnyvale}. 
'a 1 X a 2 X (1 - a3) ,  
x = {LosAltos} ; 
( l -a1)  Xa 2X(1 -a3) ,  
x = {LosAltos, Atherton} ; 
re(x)  = 
a ix ( l -a2)  X(1 
X = 
a3~ 
- -  a3)  , 
{Atherton, LosAltos, MenloPark} ; 
x = {PaloAlto} ; 
(1 -a l )  x (1 -a2)  x (1 -a3) ,  
x -- {Atherton, MenloPark, Mountain View, 
LosAltos, Sunnyvale}. 
[spt, pls]({LosAltos}) = [a 1 x a 2 X (1 - as), (1 - a3)]; 
[spt, p/s]({PaloAlto}) = [a 3, a3]. 
! l  
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The result then becomes clear from the above expressions, which exhibit 
the following relationship between the original assignments of values for 
evidence and the resulting mass function: 
1. {LosAltos} is the result as long as a 3 (the estimated value for the 
third term of evidence) is less than a 1 × a2/ (1  + a 1 × a2). Notice 
that the latter value is always less than .5. 
2. {PaloAlto} should be the conclusion if a 3 > .5. 
3. no conclusion composed of a single hypothesis can be reached if 
a~ × a2/ (1  + a 1 X a2)  _< a 3 _< .5. 
In fact, the geographical and temporal relationships, represented as com- 
patibility relations in the original problem, are sufficient to establish the 
constraint between the original assignments of values and the conclusion 
as showing in the following constraint diagram (Figure 1). 
Now, The Est imation Problem as reformulated above can be answered by 
making the following statements: 
• The constraint relationships between the original assignments of val- 
ues and the conclusion are established using only the compatibility 
relations; 
• the numbers (a set of values, one for each of the variables) represent 
points in the constraint diagram established above; 
• the numbers are redundant if they are kept within some thresholds; 
• the numbers are crucial only at those threshold points. 
This analysis gives a clear answer to our problem as stated. But there are 
two difficulties with it. 
First, it is hard to see any intuition corresponding to the threshold points 
for arbitrary expressions. This is illustrated in the above example, where 
a3 
/ \  
1.0 -- "/ / 
~ l l l l l l l l i l  i ~ i / i t  f 
~ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I I 1 , 0 ~  / / /  / ~ l ' / , ,  ~?/ ; / , "  
~ , / / / / , " ) / t ' /  /'7I 
~ / / / / / ~  . ' , ' / / / /  
" / / / / /  I /  / /  / / '  
.5 - -  ' " / / I /  / /  / /  I I I  
0 
.25 .75 .5 
Figure 1 
1.0 a l*a2 
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the first threshold is determined by a I and az, which are estimates made 
for the first and the second pieces of evidence whereas the second 
threshold is not affected by al and a 2 at all. 
Secondly, the epistemological dequacy criterion [8] is conspicuously 
violated for the following reasons: 
• the relationship between evidence and conclusion are not represented 
properly, eg, the third piece of evidence in our example determines 
the three alternative answers and is independent of other evidence (as 
we'll see below); 
• there is no intuitive correspondence of what the numbers represent to 
"the aspect of the world" under consideration. You cannot expect hat 
there really is something like Figure 1 in a person's mind when 
assigning the values; 
Our search for a satisfactory answer to The Estimation Problem is not over 
yet. 
WHAT SHOULD BE REPRESENTED? Actually, the example cited above is 
not complex and can be analyzed informally. The combination of the first 
two terms of evidence is as follows. 
m'(x)  = 
' .575, (= a 1X a2), 
x = {LosAltos, PaloAlto}; 
.225,(= (1 - a l )  X a2), 
x = {LosAltos, PaloAlto, Sunnyvale}; 
.175 (= a 1 x 
x 
0.75 (= (1 - 
x 
(1 - a2)), 
= {LosAltos, PaloAlto, Atherton, MenloPark} ; 
am) X (1 - -a2)) ,  
=~.  
The results show that, if it were not for the third piece of evidence, the 
result should be {LosAltos, PaloAlto}. That is, the first and second pieces 
of evidence pick out {LosAltos, PaloAlto), the conjunction of {LosAltos, 
PaloAlto, Sunnyvale} and {LosAltos, PaloAlto, Atherton, MenloPark}, 
which are supported by the first and second pieces of evidence, respec- 
tively. They make no difference between {LosAltos} and {PaloAlto}. It is 
clear that the conclusions above are the same no matter what the numbers 
are and even no matter what the expressions (with variables) are! 
So, the effect of the third piece of evidence is clear. Intuitively speaking, 
• if the last piece of evidence can be viewed as evidence against 
{LosAltos}, as it is in the example, our result should be {PaloAlto}; 
• if the last piece of evidence can be viewed as evidence for {LosAltos}, 
our result should be {LosAltos}; and 
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• if neither of these views is taken, the result should be kept as 
{LosAltos, PaloAlto} for there is not reason to single out either 
alternative. 
Thus, by noting only that: 
• the first piece of evidence supports {LosAltos, PaloAlto, Sunnyvale); 
• the second piece of evidence supports {LosAltos, PaloAlto, Atherton, 
MenloPark}; 
• the third piece of evidence is against {LosAltos}, or more precisely, 
there is evidence to support {LosAltos}, but there is overweighing 
evidence against {LosAltos}, 
our answer is well justified (using only set operations). These statements 
can be made by using the compatibility relations to transform the repre- 
sentations. No numbers, not even constraints on numbers are used (or 
needed). 
Thus it becomes obvious that what should be represented are the 
relationships between evidence and propositions (arguments) and the 
relation between arguments--which arguments are more believable (rela- 
tive strengths). 
It is this observation, which can also be made in other examples in the 
literature, that leads to the following representation based on relations. 
3. A RELATION-BASED REPRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE 
In this section, we present an representation method, ~/'gS:, for uncer- 
tain information based on representing arguments and their relative 
strengths. The method is described in section 3.11 and is used to represent 
the example discussed above in section 3.2. In section 3.3, we prove that all 
the differences among conclusions that can be made by any belief func- 
tions can be equilvalently represented using a special case of ~'$'5:. This 
shows ~'g'5: is a powerful representation method. 
3.1 Representation Method 
In our representation method both propositions and pieces of evidence 
themselves are treated as primitives. The information, or knowledge, is 
represented by the following two kinds of relationships. 
1. The first kind of relationship is that between an evidence body and a 
proposition. As we noticed when we analyzed the example above, the 
fact that a piece of evidence supports (or refutes) a proposition is 
1See [1, 3] for more detailed exposition of ~'~S °.
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essential when talking about an evidential reasoning procedure. We 
represent any such fact explicitly as: 
e ~p,  or e -~p. 
which are read as "e supports p"  or "e refutes p"  respectively, where 
e is a piece of evidence (or a source of evidence) and p is a 
proposition in some frame of discernment. Such relationships are 
called arguments. 
2. The second kind of relationship is that between two arguments with 
respect o their strength. Just as some properties of objects such as 
weight, amount, height can be compared without measures, we be- 
lieve it is easier to compare the weights or importance values of 
arguments than to assign belief degrees to them. In our representa- 
tion, the assertion that one argument is more believable or more 
important than another is represented explicitly as: 
a I ~ a 2 , 
read as "argument a1 is no stronger (no more believable) than a2". 
We call this kind of relationship the relative strengths of arguments. 
The associated reasoning mechanism is implemented [1] as an evidential 
reasoning environment using object-oriented paradigms [9]. The represen- 
tation method is fully formalized as a logic .9~8"S: [3] representing argu- 
ments and their relative strengths. For example, the axioms governing the 
relative strengths of arguments as given in [3] are: 
Let Pl, P2, P3 be variables for sentences in @ and el, e 2, e 2 be vari- 
ables for sentences in Se  and let ~ be a predicate. Then we have the 
following axioms: 
• Reflexive (e l ,p1)  ~ (e l ,p l ) ;  
• Transitive((ea Pl)  ~ (ez ,p2)  A (ez ,pz )  ~ (e3,P3)) ~ (e l ,p1)  
(e3, P3). 
• SuperChoice (Te( p ~ q)) ~ ( (e ,p )  ~ (e,q));  
• MoreEvidence (Te((e 1 ~ e e) A -~(e2 -~ el))) -~ ((e2,p2) ~ (el,p1)); 
• DisjunctEvidence S(el, Pl) A S(e2,P2) --~ S(e I v ez,pl vp2) .  
In [3, 2] we have also shown that ~ '~S:  is capable of representing many 
kinds of uncertain knowledge with absolute numerical measures uch as 
probability assertions and fuzzy truth values by using the concept of 
canonical example; and that, as a natural result, J / '~S ,~ provided a basis for 
a hybrid system for uncertain knowledge representation. 
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3.2 Representation for the example 
With ~g~S e, the example discussed above can be represented as follows. 
• evidence bodies {el, e2, e3}; 
• conclusions: 2°, 
where 19 = {PaloAlto, Atherton, MenloPark, MountainView, 
Los Altos, Sunnyvale} ; 
e ~ {Atherton, LosAltos, MenloPark, PaloAlto} '/ 
e 2 --, {LosAltos, PaloAlto, Sunnyvale}, [.  
• arguments: e 3 ~ {PaloAlto}, / '  
e 3 ~ {PaloA]to} ) 
• relative strengths: {(e 3 --~ {PaloAlto}) < (e 3 -~ {PaloAlto})}. 
Then queries can be answered and explanations for answers can be 
generated from this representation. 
Question: "Why do you believe that Rufus is in LosAltos?" 
Answer: "Choosing {LosAltos, PaloAlto} are supported by e 1 A e 2 and 
there is evidence, e3, against choosing {PaloAlto}." 
The fact that e 3 also supports choosing {PaloAlto} is not mentioned 
because it is overwhelmed by another argument, namely, that e 3 refutes 
choosing {PaloAlto}. 
But in certain circumstance, this particular argument could be of inter- 
est. For example, the following question in [14]: 
Question: "Is there is any reason to believe that Rufus is not in Los 
Altos?" 
can be answered properly based on the above representation. 
Answer: "Yes. Because there is argument for choosing { PaloAlto} although 
it is outweighed by other argument." 
It can be easily seen that if we change our judgment of the relationships, 
the desirable changes in the answer will be reflected directly. 
3.3 Relations that are equivalent o belief functions 
In this section, we show that all the differences among conclusions, with 
respect o how well they are supported by evidence, which can be repre- 
sented using a belief function, can be represented in an equivalent manner 
using ~S p. 
In fact, we can show that the relationships among conclusions embodied 
in any belief function are equivalent to a class of relations that is 
characterized by special cases of ~SP- -namely ,  cases where all the 
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arguments are based on a single piece of evidence. Thus, a relation 
between arguments i degenerated to a relation between conclusions--that 
def  . 
Z 1 ~A 2 = (e, A1) ~ (e, Z2). 
where A a, A 2 are sets of alternatives. 
Such a relation can be specialized further to give us a kind of relation 
between conclusions. But we need the following definition. 
DEFINITION Suppose ~ is a binary relation on ®. A non-empty proposi- 
tion A in 2 ° is called a differential point of ~q~ if and only if 
VA' cA ,  (A' A 
In the following, we will denote a differential point of R by 3'. 
Now we can define a kind of relation between conclusions as follows. 
DEFINITION A relation a~ on 2 ° (denoted by ~ ) is called a B-relation if 
and only if 
1. ~9~ is universal, ie, VA 1, A 2 ~ 2 e, we have A 1 ~ A 2 or A 2 ~ A 1 or 
both; 
2. ~qZ is a transitive, ie, VA1, Az, A 3 ~ 2 °, if A 1 ~ A 2 and A 2 ~ A3, 
then A 1 ~ A3; 
3. ~9~ is consistent with the subset relation c_, ie, VA 1, A 2 E 2 °, if 
A 1 c_A2, thenA 2 ~A2; and 
4. ~q~ is semi-cumulative in the sense that: VA1, A 2 ~ 2 e, if both A 1 and 
A 2 are differentialpoints, then A 1 u A z is also a differentialpoint. 
Notice that all these requirements can be represented by ~2'~5:. Also 
notice that the second and third conditions are derivable from the 
axioms for relative argument strengths. We include them for the in- 
tegrity of the definition of B-relations. 
In the following discussion, we will use notions A 1 = A z for (A 1 ~ A 2) 
/x(A 2~A1) ;andA l -<A2for (A l~Az)A  ~(A  2~A1) ,and  ~,>- ,  
in accordance with convention. 
If we are concerned only with the problems of choosing the more or 
most believable propositions, then we can define equivalence between two 
representations of evidence as follows: 
DEFINITION Two representations of evidence are said to be equivalent iff 
they always choose the same propositions among an arbitrary set of proposi- 
tions. 
In the following, we will establish that B-relations, which are special 
cases of relationships representable using oq'$'5:, are equivalent to belief 
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functions in the sense defined above. We need a few definitions and 
lemmas. 
DEFINITION The associated relation R (denoted by E_) of an arbitrary 
belief unction Bel is defined as: 
def 
A 1 E_ A 2 = Bel(A~) < Bel(A2).  
where A 1, A 2 are sets of alternatives. (We sometimes refer to "set of 
alternatives" as conclusion below.) 
Obviously, all the information for choice-making embodied in an arbi- 
trary belief function is carried by its associated relation and the association 
relation is clearly unique for any belief function. 
LEMMA 1 For an arbitrary belief unction Bel, there is one and only one 
B-relation equivalent to it. And the relation is Bel's associated relation R. 
Because a belief function has a unique associated relation, and it can be 
easily seen that if any relation between conclusions differs from this 
associated relation it will issue choices (of the most believable alternatives) 
different from those that the belief function issues, then the only thing we 
need to prove is that its associated relation is a B-relation. 
Now from the properties of belief functions we known that 
1. R is universal. VA1, A 2 E 2 °, we can decide their belief function 
values Bel(A 1) and Bel(A2). Furthermore, these values are two real 
numbers in the unit interval [0, 1], and real numbers are comparable 
universally. 
2. R is transitive. This follows simply from the transitivity of the "is no 
bigger than" relation of real numbers. 
3. R is an extension of the subset relation. Because VA~, A 2 ~ 2 °, if 
A~ _ A2, then A 2 = A 1 u (A 2 - A1). From the properties of belief 
functions we have 
Bel( A2) > Bel( A l )  + Bel( A 2 - A1) - Bel( A 1 A (A 2 -A1)  ) 
> BeI(A1). 
. 
ie, A 1 __ A 2. 
R is semi-cumulative. 
Let A 1 and A 2 be two differential points of R. Then, in cases where 
A 1 c_A 2 or A 2 c_A1, we will have either A~ UA 2 =A 1 or A 1 UA 2 
= A z. In either case, A 1 U A 2 is obviously a differential point as A 1 
or as A 2. 
In cases where A 1 ~ A 2 and A 2 ~ A 1. Suppose that our conclusion is 
not true, ie, A1 U A 2 is not a differential point. From the definition 
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of differential point we know that there is a proper subset B of 
A 1 U A 2 such that Be l (B) - -Be l (A  1 U A2). In this case, we have 
either A 1 ~ B or A 2 ~ B or both. Without losing generality, we 
suppose that A 1 ~ B. 
Suppose also that belief function Bel is derived from mass function 
m. 
Now if there exists a subset B' of A1 U A 2 such that 
m(B' )  > 0/x B' ~ B. 
From the definition of belief function we known that Bel(B) < 
Bel(A 1 U A 2) which conflicts with our assumption that Be l (B)= 
Bel(A 1 U A2). 
On the other hand, if there doesn't exist any subset such that 
(m(B')  > O) A (B' ~ B). Because A 1 _ A 1 u A 2, we know that there 
doesn't exist any subset of A 1 such that (m(B')  > O) A (B' ~ B), ie, 
for all subsets A' 1 of A 1, if m(A')  > 0 then A' _c B, and A' _c B (3 A v 
From this using the definition of belief function, we will have 
Bel(A 1) = Bel(A 1 c~ B). However, this conflicts with that A 1 is a 
differential point because A 1 ¢5 B is a proper subset of A r 
Thus, A 1 u A 2 is a differential point and our conclusion is true. 
So R is a B-relation. • 
To establish that a B-relation also determines equivalently a belief func- 
tion, we need a few more definitions and lemmas. 
DEFINITION Suppose ~ is a B-relation. Then the differential collection F 
of ~ is the set of all differential points of ~ .  
LEMMA 2 Suppose ~ is a B-relation and F is its differential collection. 
Then, Vy ~ F and A ~ 2 °, if 3' "< A, then 37' ~ F such that 
y -< y' ~ A and y' c A. 
Proof Obviously A 4= &. For otherwise we have y ~ th which means y 
cannot be a differential point. We use induction on the number of 
elements in A, ie, on ]AI. 
1. induction base: 
If  IA[1 = 1, then A = {a} for some a ~ O. Because A's only proper 
subset is ~b and we have ~b -< y -< A, then from .9~'s transitivity we 
have ~b ~ A. So by definition of differential point we know that A is 
itself a differential point. Letting A be the y', the lemma will be 
satisfied. 
2. induction hypothesis: 
Suppose the lemma is true for A if I A] < n. 
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3. induction process: 
For A such that IAI = n, we have the following: 
(a) If A ~ F, then A is the 3" we need for the lemma. 
(b) If A ~ F, ie, A is not a differential point, then, from the 
definition of differential point, there exists at least one proper 
subset A' of A such that A' -- A. Now V3' ~ F, if -/-< A, we have 
3' ~< A -- A' and I A'[ < n, 
then from the induction hypothesis, we have a 3" such that 
31-< 3" ~ A' -- A .  
This ends our induction and the proof of the lemma. • 
Informally, l emma 2 says that if a proposition (a subset of the frame of 
discernment) is strictly more believable than a differential point, then 
there is always a differential point that is strictly more believable than the 
given differential point and is a subset of the given proposition. 
LEMMA 3 Suppose R is a B-relation and F is its differential collection. 
Then F can be denoted as 
where 
F = {3"~, 3"2 . . . . .  3".} 
V i, j ~ [1 . . . . .  n], i f  i < j then 3"i ~ 3"j. 
Proof Because F is a subset of 2 C') and ~' is a relation on 2 °, then 
can be restricted to F to form a relation .9~' on F. And 2 '  is a universal, 
transitive relation (on F). The lemma follows obviously. • 
With this arrangement of F we can define a function m' as follows: 
for 1 < i < n,m'(3" i  ) = 2 index(y') -- E rn(3"j); 
7jc 3', 
where index ( 3"i) --- minv, = v( J). 
LEMMA4 m'(y i )>  0. 
Proof First, we can notice that index( i )  < i. 
Let  k = rnaxvk,~v(k') ,  we have k < index( i )  because otherwise we will 
have 3"i -- 3"k that conflicts with the assumption that yi is a differential 
point. 
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m'( yi) = 2index(~i) __ 
>_ 2indexO'i) _ 
>_ 2index(r i )  _ 
2index('h) __ 
Proof 
we have 
m(~)  
~c 7i 
E m(~)  
l~ j~k  
~., 2 j 
l~ j~k  
F_, 2J 
1 ~ j~(md~(~) -  1) 
=1>0.  • 
Let K= Ei~j~nm(yj) .  Normalize function m' with K will give us a 
function m that 
m'(3t i )  
m( Yi) = _ _  
K 
If we let m(A)  = 0 for all A c O such that A ~ F then m is a obviously 
a mass function. 
Let Bel be the belief function derived from m. We have the following 
lemmas for the function Bel. These lemmas will show that the belief 
function so constructed is equivalent to the original B-relation. 
LEMMA 5 Bel(y i) = 2index~i)/K and Bel(y i) < Bel(y k) iff ~t i ~_~ ~/j. 
First, by noticing that m(A')  = 0 if A' is not a differential point, 
Bel(Yi) = ~_, m(yy) 
yjc_ ~ 
= m(,),i) + ~ rn(yj)  
~jc ~ 
= 2 index~' i /g .  
Similarly, we have Bel( Tk ) = 2inaex(~k)/K. 
But from the definition of index we know that index(Ti) < index(yk) iff 
% ~ 3'k, thus we also have Bel(y i) < Bel(yj) iff y~ < 7j. • 
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LEMMA 6 I f  there is no differential point in A, the Bel(A) = O. I f  there 
are differential points on A, then Bel( A ) = Bel( y i ), where i = maxv,, ~ A(i'). 
Proof 
1. Notice that m(A')  = m' (A ' ) /K  = 0 if A' is not a differential point. 
Thus, if there is no differential point in A, then Be l (A)= 
~A,c_Am(A ') = O. 
2. If there are differential points in A, let 
A' = U{Yk'lYk, cA} .  
From the definition of B-relation, we known that A' is itself a 
differential point. Denote A' = Yk. Then, we have i = k because we 
have k _< i from the definition of i and i < k from 7i - -A'  = Yk and 
7i --< 7k. 
From Y~ ---A we have Bel(7/) <_ Bel(A). But if Bel(%) < Bel(A), 
then from the definition of belief function we known that there is a 
subset A" of A such that m(A")  > 0 and A" ~ Y/= A'. However, 
m(A") > 0 means that A" is a differential point and thus A" c_ A' = 
Y/. We have a confliction. So, Bel(7/) < Bel(A) is false and Bel(A) = 
Bel(7~) is true. • 
LEMMA 7 Suppose ~ is a B-relation and Bel is the belief function 
constructed from ~ as above, then ~ is the same as the associated relation 
R of Bel. 
Proof Suppose A 1 and A 2 are two propositions in 2 °. 
From the last lemma, we have some i, j ~ [1, n] such that 
Bel( A 1) = Bel( 7i) = 2index(v')/K 
and 
Bel( A2) = Bel( yj) = 2ineex(~")/K. 
We are going to prove that ~ '  = R. 
1. We first show that O; ~_ R. 
Suppose 
A~ ~A 2, ie, Bel(A~) >BeI (A2) .  
We have Bel(Ti) > Bel(yj). Thus index(Ti) > index(Tj) and Yi ~ 7i- 
If A 1 ~ A2 is not true, from the fact that ~ '  is an R-relation which is 
universal we will have A z>-A 1. But 7i is a subset of A l thus 
A 1 ~ y/. This gives us 
A 2 >-A~ ~ 7 /~ 7j. 
ie, A 1 >- -yj. 
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From lemma 2, there exists some Yk which is a subset of A 2 such 
that 
A2 w yk >" y i 
which conflicts with the assumption that j = maxvj, _~ A2(J') and A s 
A 2 must be true. 
2. Now we show that R ___oq'. 
Suppose A 1 ~ A 2. 
Assume Bel(A 1) > Bel(A 2) is false. Then we will have Bel(A 2) > 
Bel(A 1) and yj >- Yi. This gives us that 
A1 ~ A2 ~ 'Yj >" 'Yi, 
ie, 
AI >'Ti. 
But from lemma 2, there will be a Yk such that Yk ~" Yi, Yk C_ A1, and 
k > i. This conflicts with the assumption that i = maxv, , ~ AI(i'). 
Thus Bel(A 1) >_ Bel(A 2) must be true and so be A 1 -1A 2, ie, R __~. 
So we have R = ~', and that establishes our lemma. • 
Now, our equivalence theorem follows naturally. 
THEOREM 1 For an arbitrary belief unction Bel, there is one and only one 
B-relation that is equivalent to it. And for an arbitrary B-relation, there are 
belief functions that are equivalent to it. • 
3.4 An Answer For The Estimation Problem 
With the availability this representation and an understanding of its 
power and simplicity, we can supply a satisfactory and pragmatic answer 
for The Estimation Problem as follows. 
For choosing among alternatives under consideration, the only estimates 
needed are relationships between evidence and propositions (arguments) and 
relationships between arguments (relative strengths). 
Changes in these estimates have intuitive effects on the answer (as we have 
illustrated above). 
4. RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER WORK 
The inadequacies of numerical degrees are widely noted in the litera- 
ture. Usually, this inappropriateness i  viewed as an unsuitable limitation, 
and many extensions and alternatives have been proposed. But none 
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address The Estimation Problem directly, which makes comparisons of our 
work with them difficult and inaccurate. Nevertheless, from the following 
discussions we can see that not all of these methods reach a satisfactory 
answer to the problem. 
4.1 Inequality MethodsmExtending Crisp Values to Intervals 
Many researchers have contributed to methods that replace the crisp 
values in ordinary methods with pairs of values or intervals. These studies 
are motivated from various perspectives. For example, in Gordon and 
Shortliffe [5], intervals are used as a pragmatic method to improve perfor- 
mance. 
Usually, these methods are pursued as one way of extending probabilis- 
tic reasoning methods (through not necessarily the Bayesian method). By 
extending the crisp values in ordinary evidential reasoning to allow inter- 
vals, these studies try to reveal the implicit assumptions that underlay 
different evidential reasoning methods, and then to state these assump- 
tions explicitly. For example, in Grosof [6], these assumptions are treated 
as "type-2" evidence. These methods result in inequality paradigms for 
probabilistic reasoning based on logics of upper and lower bounds on 
conditional probabilities. It has been shown that this paradigm covers 
many well known mechanisms, eg, Dempster-Shafer theory, Bayesian 
method, maximum entropy method, and many methods with networks. 
The motivation behind these studies is to clarify the relationship be- 
tween the initial and final assignments of numbers. This is done mostly by 
specifying what property of numbers is or is not derivable from the initial 
assumptions. 
One of our motivations imilar to this is to clarify the relation between 
original assumptions and the properties of the resulting method. But we go 
further in both the direction of representing initial evidence bodies and 
the direction of conclusion extraction. In the former direction, a further 
step beyond the numbers hows that the evidence can be assessed without 
numbers, and actually, it is easier to assess evidence without the obliga- 
tions of numbers and combination rules or other assumptions behind 
them. In the other direction, where conclusions are derived, a further step 
shows us that numbers attached to these conclusions are usually irrelevant. 
We can see that although these works are based on observation of the 
imperfections of method with crisp values, they fail to reveal the source of 
the clumsiness. Thus their results still cannot be well justified with respect 
to The Estimation Problem. Actually, there are works, such as that of 
Tong and Appelbaum [15], which show that this kind of extension, in 
applications, contributes little to avoid the difficulties discussed above. 
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4.2 Bayesian Networks-Enforcing Dependency Relationships 
It has been clear that traditional probability theory alone is not ade- 
quate for evidential reasoning. Some supplements hat enhance probabilis- 
tic reasoning with networks have been proposed. 
Pearl's Bayesian etworks can be taken as representative of such meth- 
ods [11, 10]. The key idea of Bayesian networks is to represent the direct 
causal (and/or probabilistic) influences between propositions and to form 
networks of dependence models. In a Bayesian etwork, nodes are propo- 
sitions and weighted links signify the existence of such influences. The 
strengths of these influences are quantified by conditional probabilities. In 
Pearl's book [10], necessary but insufficient conditions for the existence of 
such dependence models are axiomized. 
These studies can be viewed as efforts to relieve the demand for large 
amounts of information by incorporating some non-numerical information, 
ie, structural and relational information, into the probabilistic sphere. 
Thus they are actually hybrid mechanisms. In [10]. Pearl presented two 
pieces of justification for his work, namely, that there is no reason to 
abandon the Bayesian method which is of theoretical elegance; and that 
enhancing the Bayesian method with dependency networks will circumvent 
most of the criticisms of the Bayesian method. 
The most important part of Pearl's work is the elegant set of axioms that 
qualifies a Bayesian etwork, although it is a little misleading to represent 
dependence when what is really useful is independence. 
Concerning The Estimation Problem, with the help of these networks, 
the methods under discussion have addressed one of the essential part of 
evidential reasoning. However, being based on conventional numerical 
methods, these shares the same faults as other numerical methods. In 
addition, it seems to be difficult to assess the complete set of direct causal 
influences that is required in such a method. The problem is: if our 
knowledge about nodes is not complete, how can we assess their complete 
relationships? Furthermore, not all the relationships are always necessary. 
But in the Bayesian etwork method, the complete network of dependen- 
cies is simply taken for granted with little justification. 
There is a common part of our proposed method and the Bayesian 
network method--that emphasis is put on the structural information--but 
they are quite different. Alongside the contrasting place they give to 
numbers, another distinction lies in the fact that we treat the structural 
information as part of the evidence whereas the Bayesian etwork method 
takes it for granted. From this it can be seen that the user interface for the 
Bayesian network methods is not clear and we claim that the user 
interface for our method is well established and very suitable for evidential 
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reasoning. Actually, according to the object-oriented style by which our 
system is implemented, the user interface is the first thing we studied. 
4.3 Reasoning About UncertaintymReplacing Numbers With Reasons 
Cohen [4] has reported work on evidential reasoning. One explicitly 
stated purpose of his study is to see "how far one can go in evidential 
reasoning without measures of evidence." In a sense, our work can be 
viewed as being in the same direction as his. But, as will be seen below, his 
work would be better viewed as a complement to many numerical eviden- 
tial reasoning methods instead of as an opponent. 
Two basic observations based on his work are that "we know much 
about uncertainty besides belief measures" and "it is extremely difficult o 
assess these numbers." Trying to circumvent these problems, he avoids 
numbers by replacing them with endorsements that are records of reasons 
for believing or disbelieving a hypothesis. 
It seems that the aim pursued by Cohen is a little different from the aim 
we usually associate with evidential reasoning. As he himself puts it, his 
work is actually a model to permit us to reason about uncertainty and the 
aims it to try to circumvent, diminish, or avoid uncertainty in reasoning. 
The aim we usually associate with evidential reasoning is to reason under 
uncertainty and to reach some conclusion using the reasoning process. 
This contrast can be seen best from the comparison between endorse- 
ment and Bayesian methods made by the author himself. One dimension 
of the comparison is that of representational adequacy, which he put as 
"what can I say about uncertainty in the language of Bayesian theory and 
the language of endorsement." But usually, in evidential reasoning, the 
problem of representational adequacy is addressed as "what situations 
with uncertainty and incomplete information can be represented and how 
can a rational conclusion be reached." In this sense, again, our work is 
complementary to Cohen's, and it leads us to assert that Cohen's work 
should be viewed as being complementary to conventional numerical 
evidential methods. 
Our proposed method iffers from the endorsement model at an essen- 
tial point. Whereas the endorsement model, replacing traditional numbers 
with records of reasons for believing or disbelieving a hypothesis (endorse- 
ments), is based on the assumption that the reasoning system can judge 
between hypotheses (Cohen seems to prefer other words such as "account" 
to "judge") with these reasons, our method is based on the assumption 
that these judgments are the most important evidence we can get and, 
representing the sum of our background knowledge, these judgments 
cannot often be judged as simply as is done in the endorsement model. For 
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our method, these judgments are perceived outside the evidential reason- 
ing system and are treated as primitives inside the system. We believe 
these judgments are the most suitable interface between the evidential 
reasoning system and the users. 
As in Cohen's method, there are no numbers in our proposed method. 
But in their place we put relationships, or comparisons which represent 
judgments. At the user's end of the interface, as we have already seen in 
earlier sections, these non-numerical data items can be more easily as- 
sessed. At the evidential reasoning end of the interface, they are what are 
really needed. The importance of these judgments makes it unfortunate 
that Cohen rejects explicit judgments at the same time as he rejects 
numbers because these judgments can actually be accommodated in his 
model without numbers. 
Because the direction of Cohen's work is different, it is hard to see 
whether or not his method will issue a satisfactory answer to The Estima- 
tions Problem without further detailed analysis. 
4.4 Preference Relat ions--And Converting Them to Belief Functions 
In Wong and Lingas [16], a relatively limited work that is very similar to 
the method we mentioned in section 3.2 is reported. The authors claim 
that the preference relations are more easily available than belief func- 
tions and report that such preference relations can consistently convert o 
belief functions. Because we don't know if this work has been presented in 
a wider context, it. is not possible to discuss the contribution to The 
Estimation Problem of this work. But it seems that the authors in [16] have 
not noticed or discussed the potential of inconsistency when more than 
one preference relations are under consideration, caused by the fact that 
for a given preference relation, there is more than one belief function 
corresponding to it. In addition, however, we do know that the result we 
reached is better than that in [16]. 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
At the outset we posed a problem for which conventional evidential 
methods cannot provide a satisfactory answer. Pursuing this problem has 
led us to replace numerical belief degrees with relations and to propose a 
new evidence representation method. We have established an important 
result in evidential theory that B-relations are equivalent to belief func- 
tions in a particular sense. We have discussed the intuitiveness of our 
method of representation f mass of evidence by relations, with particular 
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reference to a well-known example from the literature. Our method is 
complementary to those suggested by a number of other researchers. 
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